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Martin de Barcos (1600-78), is generally regarded as a second-rank figure in the 
history of Port-Royal, less prominent than his uncle, Jean Duvergier de 
Hauranne, whom he succeeded as abbé de Saint-Cyran, or Antoine Arnauld, or 
Pierre Nicole, let alone the subject of this conference, Blaise Pascal.1 Sainte-
Beuve observes that, after his uncle’s death, he never expressed a fundamental 
view (‘sentiment essentiel’) or a practical recommendation (‘conseil de 
circonstance’) that went unchallenged by his colleagues.2 Having mentioned 
the controversy, of which more presently, occasioned by the posthumous 
publication of the Exposition de la foy de l’Eglise romaine touchant la grâce et la 
prédestination, Sainte-Beuve remarks that Barcos ‘avait la plume un peu 
fâcheuse, c’est-à-dire qui allait tout au travers aux endroits délicats, en était 
venu à ne plus pouvoir composer un seul écrit sans donner prise par mille 
saillies de doctrine’ (I, 393). The Dictionnaire de Port-Royal provides a detailed 
biography, but does not discuss his theology or his personality as such.3 The 
main exception to this view is Lucien Goldmann, of whose interpretation of 
Jansenism Barcos is the keystone. For, (so Goldmann thought) he embodied the 
radical current of Jansenism, the full-scale tragic vision, articulated in Pascal 
and Racine but diluted in the more prominent exponents of the doctrine, 
Arnauld and Nicole.4 But even Goldmann says that ‘Martin de Barcos ne fut ni 
un grand penseur ni un grand écrivain’ (1).  
 None the less, he has some claim on our attention, especially in 
connection with Pascal, even if we do not accept Goldmann’s account of their 
relationship. For we are told by Nicole that, although Pascal was ‘la personne 
du monde le plus roide et le plus inflexible pour les dogmes de la grace 
efficace’, he would say that, if he were to set about expounding the matter, he 
would hope to ‘rendre cette doctrine si plausible, & de la dépouiller tellement 
d’un certain air farouche qu’on lui donne, qu’elle serait proportionnée au goût 
de toutes sortes d’esprits’; and that, had his health permitted, he would have 
tried to ‘rendre toutes ces matieres si plausibles & si populaires, que tout le 
monde y auroit entré sans peine’.5 Now Barcos attempted something 
comparable in his Exposition de la foy de l’Eglise romaine touchant la grâce et la 
prédestination. Indeed, the early twentieth-century Catholic Encyclopedia, not 
by any means a sympathetic source, says that the Exposition ‘may be looked 
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upon as the official exposé of Jansenism’.6 Of course, as its title suggests, it 
represented itself not at all as expounding a distinct doctrine identifiable as 
Jansenism, but as a restatement of traditional Catholic teaching: the name of 
Jansenius never appears in it. I want to discuss the text’s relation to the concept 
of ‘Jansenism’. But, since its project of expounding the true Augustinian 
doctrine of grace coincides with that of Pascal in the Écrits sur la grâce, I shall 
also discuss the similarities and dissimilarities between Barcos and Pascal’s 
handling of the theological issues. 
 Much light is thrown both on the origins and the reception of the 
Exposition in additional material provided in the edition of the text published 
along with Arnauld’s Instructions sur la grâce in 1700.7 Here it is stated that the 
Exposition was commissioned by Bishop Pavillon of Alet, one of the most 
prominent Jansenist sympathizers among the episcopate, to serve as a textbook 
in his diocesan seminary. So far from thinking that it was best to leave the 
faithful ignorant of theology, Pavillon believed that they could not practise 
sound piety without an understanding of the true doctrines of grace and 
predestination. He therefore got Barcos to write the Exposition.8  A cleric who 
had been in the seminary of Alet and who possessed a copy for his private use, 
thought it should be published. (This must have taken place many years after 
the deaths of both Barcos (1678) and Pavillon (1677).) The cleric had it 
published ‘à Orleans comme on le croit’, without giving the author’s name, and 
stating in the preface that Pavillon should be considered the real author.9  
 Opposition was aroused, and the Chancellor, who at this time would 
have been Louis Boucherat, comte de Compans, had 600 copies seized in Paris. 
The book was handed over to two Sorbonne doctors opposed to its views, to be 
censured, but other doctors heard of this and proclaimed it was just an accurate 
explanation of St Augustine’s doctrine, which treated other views with 
moderation. Thus the plan to get the Sorbonne to censure it was abandoned, 
and the hostile party denounced the book to the then Archbishop (Louis-
Antoine de Noailles). He first referred it back to the Sorbonne, but was finally 
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pressured into condemning it, which, according to the ‘Avertissement’, he 
would never have done, if he knew it represented Pavillon’s views.10 
 In point of fact, the moving spirit behind the publication seems to have 
been Dom Gabriel Gerberon, the Benedictine partisan of Jansenism (1628-1711). 
It was he who produced the ‘Remarques’ on Noailles’s condemnation, which, 
along with the text of the condemnation, are printed in the second edition of 
the text.11 
 So much, for the moment, for the genesis of the Exposition. The text 
itself follows a question-and-answer method, ideally suited for its purpose as a 
textbook, and naturally cites references to any number of scriptural and 
patristic passages in support of its doctrine. It explicitly forestalls the objection 
that such issues are best not put before the faithful. On the contrary, those 
without the knowledge of grace ‘se nourrissent dans une fausse confiance qu’ils 
mettent dans leur justice, croians trouver dans leur fond tout ce qui est 
nécessaire pour fuir le vice, pour embrasser la vertu, & pour s’acquitter d’une 
maniére irréprochable de toutes leurs obligations’ (2). It is therefore incumbent 
on the clergy to preach the truth on this matter to the faithful, following in this 
the example of St Augustine (3-6). Similarly, to hide from the people the 
mystery of predestination is to encourage the arrogance of the Pelagians. In 
itself the mystery edifies and consoles; it causes scandal and disturbance only 
when proclaimed in the wrong spirit, to lead astray rather than instruct. It is 
not one of those mysteries only to be handled by the learned, and of which one 
can know nothing without detriment to Christian piety (228). The truths of 
grace and predestination are absolutely necessary to make us pray properly, to 
tame natural pride, to establish sincere humility, to preserve us from 
ingratitude to Redeemer, to make us dread the terrible justice of his 
judgements, and so forth. They must be taught to all Christians (228-9); and 
Barcos adopts various suggestions from Augustine (De dono perseverantiæ, 
XXII.57-62) as to how to preach them prudently and tactfully (229-30). 
 Pascal, as is well known, seeks to present the doctrines of Augustine as a 
via media between the errors of Calvin and Molina. The twofold reference to 
these writers is also a feature of Barcos’s text. But Barcos is more concerned 
than Pascal to situate what he is saying with reference to a broad range of 
positions held by scholastic theologians, because his intended readership could 
be expected to be familiar or at least acquainted with these. 
  The doctrines Barcos expounds will be in their essence familiar to those 
who have read the Écrits sur la grâce. Rather than merely recapitulating them, I 
shall therefore focus on the way Barcos and his editors engage with the fact of 
the condemnation of the Five Propositions. 
In his condemnation of the Exposition, Noailles represented it as merely 
restating a doctrine already condemned at Rome.12 The ‘Remarques’ that follow 
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the text in the 1700 edition challenge his ruling: however closely the 
Archbishop has had the Exposition examined, and examined it himself, this 
doesn’t deprive other theologians of their right to pass judgement on it and 
even to oppose his, if they think it contrary to teaching of Church or ‘injurieux’ 
to those who teach and defend it. Those with the best knowledge of such 
matters and who have most closely studied Augustine and his disciples see the 
Exposition as containing only his pure doctrine. They are entitled to say so and 
not obliged to defer to the Archbishop (386).  
But the ‘Remarques’ also prolong and adapt two key strategies of 
Jansenist polemic discourse. The notorious Five Propositions were already 
circulating before Innocent X’s bull Cum occasione of 1653. They made their 
first appearance on a list of propositions (seven originally), which in July 1649 
Nicolas Cornet, then syndic of the Sorbonne, claimed to have found in theses 
put forward by bacheliers, and which he invited the Faculty to condemn. (The 
‘Remarques’ speak of Cornet as fabricating them (374)). The Augustinians’ first 
response to the five propositions was to argue that they were ambiguous: they 
could be taken either in an orthodox or a heretical sense.13 The ‘Remarques’ 
maintain this view: the Five Propositions are ambiguous, containing a heretical 
sense, condemned by the whole Church, and the sense of St Augustine, which 
the Popes never intended to condemn (394-5). None the less, this line of 
argument was made more difficult to sustain by the promulgation of Cum 
occasione, which simply condemns the propositions, and does not distinguish 
between orthodox and heretical senses. At this point, a shift of terrain was 
necessary, and Arnauld invoked the distinction between fait and droit: the 
Papal condemnation of the content of the propositions, bearing on a matter of 
faith, is authoritative; but it does not settle the point of fact, as to whether the 
propositions are in fact in Jansenius’s Augustinus; and in fact, argues Arnauld, 
they are not (Provinciales, 27). Pascal endorses this line in the first Provinciale 
(117-18).  This twofold defensive manoeuvre was itself condemned in Alexander 
VII’s Ad sanctam beati Petri sedem of 16 October 1656: the propositions are in 
Jansenius’s book and they were condemned in the sense in which he 
maintained them.14 None the less, the ‘Remarques’ continue to maintain that 
the Five Propositions were never in the Augustinus, let alone in the sense 
condemned, and that they have never been discovered in the text in nearly fifty 
years since (Exposition, 374). But, more interestingly perhaps from our point of 
view, the ‘Remarques’ argue that the Exposition is unaffected by the 
condemnation of the Five Propositions.  
To be sure, if Cum occasione is taken as condemning a body of doctrine 
through the condemnation of five representative propositions, then Barcos’s 
doctrine does not escape scot-free, for in its substance it is identical to that of 
Jansenius and Pascal (who follows Jansenius very closely, as Philippe Sellier has 
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shown).15 But if it is taken as condemning specific propositions, or condemning 
them only in a particular sense, then the possibility emerges of maintaining the 
essential neo-Augustinian doctrine without falling foul of the condemnation. 
The ‘Remarques’ claim in effect that the Exposition realizes this possibility. 
Moreover, because, unlike the Provinciales, it does not commit itself to the 
defence of Jansenius by name, the Exposition can be seen as evading the explicit 
condemnation of Jansenius in Ad sanctam Petri sedem. 
The ‘Remarques’, then, adapt to the Exposition the two strategies put 
into effect in the original defence of Jansenius. They discuss the Propositions in 
terms of a distinction between heretical and orthodox senses; and they deny 
that the Propositions themselves are to be found in Barcos’s text. 
The distinction between heretical and orthodox senses is mobilized in 
connection with the First Proposition, which runs as follows: 
Aliqua Dei praecepta hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus 
secundum praesentes quas habent vires, sunt impossibilia; deest 
quoque illis gratia, qua possibilia fiant.16 
 
Some commandments of God are impossible to justified human beings 
willing and striving to the best of their available strength; moreover, 
these people lack the grace by which they would become possible. 
 First, as the ‘Remarques’ point out, the Exposition does not literally 
restate this claim (387). Secondly, the Proposition has both a heretical and an 
orthodox sense. If, then, the Archbishop’s claim is that the Exposition upholds 
the heretical sense of the Proposition, let him explain in what this sense 
consists (388). Certainly, insofar as the Proposition maintains the doctrine that 
without efficacious grace we can do nothing it is impossible to reject it without 
clashing with the followers of SS. Thomas and Augustine, and renewing 
Pelagian heresy (389). The proposition that St Peter was deprived in the 
moment of his fall of the grace without which we can do nothing is in 
Augustine and Chrysostom (391). 
The Proposition in short has two meanings. The first is as follows: 
Qu’il y a des commandemens de Dieu qui sont simplement & 
absolument impossibles aux justes mêmes, quelque bonne volonté 
qu’ils ayent, & quelque effort qu’ils fassent pour les garder; & qu’ils 
n’ont point de grace qui les leur rende possibles. (395) 
 This, say the ‘Remarques’ is contrary to Scripture, Augustine, and all the 
Fathers (395); and this is the heretical sense condemned by the Popes (395-6). 
However there is another possible meaning:  
L’autre sens est, qu’il arrive quelquefois que des justes même, qui ont 
quelque volonté, mais imparfaite, & qui font quelque effort, mais trop 
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foible; n’ont pas alors un pouvoir entier & prochain de garder quelque 
Commandement de Dieu: la Grace & le secours qui leur devroit donner 
ce pouvoir prochain & achevé, ne leur étant pas donné. (396) 
 This is Catholic doctrine, and clearly not condemned (396). In fact 
Barcos himself, in the body of the text, argues that the commandments are 
possible not only to just, but even to sinners, since they can always fulfil them 
with the help of grace, and quotes the Council of Trent in support of this view 
(186-7). 
 On this showing, say the ‘Remarques’, Barcos can’t be accused of holding 
the First Proposition (396-7); for to say that some commandments are 
impossible even to the just who wish and strive to fulfil them this is not the 
same as saying what he does say, that some of the just in some circumstances 
lack the necessary grace to avoid falling into mortal sin (398). 
 At this point the reader might be feeling confused. Which of the 
strategies is being mobilized here? Is the claim that Barcos upholds the First 
Proposition, but in an orthodox, not a heretical sense? Or is it that he does not 
uphold it at all? It seems that the ‘Remarques’ are operating with two different 
modes of analysis. First, referential: that is, a proposition can be taking as 
alluding to and summarizing some existing doctrine; second, verbal: it can be 
viewed as an autonomous verbal construct. (Pascal makes a similar distinction 
between examining the meaning of a proposition (in this case a 
pronouncement of the Council of Trent) ‘par les simples termes’ and examining 
it in view of ‘l’objet qu’ont eu les Pères et le concile en faisant cette décision’.17) 
From the former point of view, the First Proposition could be taken to be 
conveying either a heretical (hardline Protestant) position and an orthodox 
Catholic position. It could be read as an argument a fortiori for the Protestant 
view: it is absolutely impossible for human beings to fulfil the commandments, 
because even the justified cannot be sure of doing so, however much they want 
and try to. But this is not, say the Augustinians, what a Catholic theologian 
means when he points to the betrayal by Christ of St Peter, as an indication that 
the just are sometimes unable to fulfil the commandments: for he denies the 
Protestant’s basic assumption that the commandments are intrinsically 
impossible. Now, the Papal condemnation cannot possibly apply to the 
orthodox Catholic position. It must therefore be aimed at the Protestant view. 
Here then the line of defence is that Barcos upholds the orthodox doctrine. 
Secondly, his position is to be measured against the letter of the Proposition. 
The proposition refers to the inability to fulfil the commandments of 
‘hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus, secundum praesentes quas habent 
vires’, which appears to mean that they fail to fulfil the commandments, 
however much they wish to and however hard they try to. But from Barcos’s 
point of view, the justified who fail to fulfil the commandments are wishing and 
trying indeed, but only feebly. So they do not come under the scope of the 
Proposition.  
                                                 
17
 Pascal, Écrits sur la grâce, II, in Œuvres complètes, ed. Michel Le Guern, 2 vols, Bibliothèque 
de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1998-2000), vol. II, p. 221. All subsequent references are to this 
edition. 
 7 
Moreover, the ‘Remarques’ go on to argue, none of the other four 
propositions is to be found in the Exposition (402). I shall run through them 
briefly, and then examine each point in more detail. Take the Second 
Proposition: ‘Interiori gratiae in statu naturae lapsae nunquam resistitur’ (in the 
state of fallen nature there is no resisting interior grace). Barcos shows that we 
do resist inner graces of the understanding and weak graces of the will; and 
that we even struggle against strong graces of the will, even if we don’t resist 
them in the sense of overcoming them. Also we resist grace by ruining its effect 
through sin (403). The same reasons apply to the Fourth Proposition:  
 
 Semipelagiani admittebant praevenientis gratiae interioris 
necessitatem ad singulos actus, etiam ad initium fidei; et in hoc erant 
haeretici, quod vellent eam gratiam talem esse, cui posset humana 
voluntas resistere vel obtemperare. 
 
The Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of a prevenient interior 
grace for particular acts, and even for the beginnings of faith; and they 
were heretical in this respect, that they wanted this grace to be such 
that the human will could resist it or comply with it. 
 
This is not Barcos’s view, for he does not think that it is heretical to hold 
that the human will can resist grace (405-6); on the contrary, he agrees that it 
can. The issue of the Third Proposition is human freedom: 
Ad merendum et demerendum in statu naturae lapsae non requiritur in 
homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione. 
 
In order to be able to merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature, it is 
not necessary that human beings should possess freedom from 
necessity; freedom from coercion is sufficient. 
 Barcos shows that the strongest efficacious grace does not jeopardise, 
but actually strengthens our freedom. Moreover, he connects our meriting and 
demeriting in this state with liberty of indifference, in the sense of having the 
power to resist grace even when under its influence (404). He shows that the 
will, though determined by grace, acts freely, not by necessity; an absolute 
necessity, which removed the power to resist the good to which grace conveys 
us would be contrary to freedom as we possess it in this state. Moreover, there 
is a sense in which we can be said to possess liberty of indifference, in both its 
forms, namely contrariety and contradiction; and this is a proof of our freedom. 
He does not, then, reduce freedom to absence of coercion, as does the Third 
Proposition (405).18 
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 What of the Fifth Proposition, ‘Semipelagianum est dicere, Christum pro 
omnibus omnino hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse’ (it is Semi-
Pelagian to say that Christ died or shed his blood for all human beings 
whatever)? Barcos, the ‘Remarques’ point out, most certainly does not hold that 
it is a Semi-Pelagian error to say Christ died for all human beings.19 In fact, he 
says it would be odious to claim that Christ did not die for all (407; cf. 205). 
Jesus died not only for the predestined but also for the reprobate (408). 
Therefore, in sum, Barcos cannot be accused of renewing the heresy of the Five 
Propositions (408-9). 
 So much for the defence of Barcos in the ‘Remarques’. Let us now look at 
his arguments in more detail, so as to exhibit the underlying issues more fully. 
 Barcos’s aim, in his discussion of the possibility of the commandments 
(the subject of the First Proposition) is to confute the theory, which he would 
call Molinist, that all human beings receive sufficient grace to observe the 
commandments, or to pray for the help to do so, and that, if they do not fulfil 
the commandments, this is because they have chosen to reject this grace. An 
argument in favour of the Molinist view is that, if all do not have sufficient 
grace, this means that the commandments are impossible to those to whom 
God does not give the grace to accomplish them (186). If this is so, how can 
sinners be morally responsible for their failure to obey the commandments? 
 Barcos rejects this line of argument. Augustine says that the 
commandments are possible not only to the just, but to the greatest sinners, for 
though God commands what man cannot perform with all his natural powers, 
man can perform it with the help of grace (186-7). If God commands us to do 
what in a given situation we can’t do, and doesn’t in that situation give us the 
grace to fulfil his commandments, he does so in order that we will make the 
effort to obtain grace.   
 To say that God does not give everyone sufficient grace to accomplish 
the commandments is by no means verging on Calvinist heresy (187). For 
Calvin teaches that the commandments are impossible, even with grace: 
Calvin dit que les plus justes (lesquels dans son sens ne sont tels que 
par une justice qui leur est imputée, & non pas par une justice 
véritable) transgressent sans cesse la Loi de Dieu, & qu’ils ne peuvent 
l’accomplir, parce qu’ils pechent mortellement en toutes leurs actions: 
au lieu que l’Eglise enseigne que les Justes accomplissent vraiment les 
Commandemens de Dieu, quoiqu’elle reconnoisse qu’il y en a qui sont 
quelquefois dans l’impuissance d’en accomplir quelqu’un. (188) 
 The Catholics, therefore, deny that the commandments are impossible.  
First, because ‘impossible’ does not mean ‘what some people cannot do’, but 
means ‘impossible in any circumstances, even with help of grace’ (188-9). Many 
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things are impossible to some, yet possible to others, or can be done if we have 
some assistance, without which we cannot do them. Thus St Thomas says that 
we cannot love God, or believe the articles of faith, without the help of grace: 
but these things are not impossible because we can do them with the help of 
grace, even though it is not given to all. Secondly, because ‘Dieu ne nous 
commande rien que nous ne puissions observer si nous voulons’ (189). In 
support Barcos quotes Augustine’s claim that we can observe the 
commandments if we want to.20 A thing is in our power when we do it if we will 
to do it, and do not do it if we do not will to do it. The will, of course, must 
come from God (189). 
 So when it is said that man cannot fulfil the commandments without 
grace what this means is that  ‘il n’a pas tout ce qui est absolument necessaire 
de la part de Dieu pour les accomplir effectivement’, i.e. he lacks the efficacious 
grace. This does not mean he is absolutely powerless, for the power to fulfil the 
commandments remains within human nature, which has not been destroyed 
by sin (190-1). It is identical with the will, which is intrinsically flexible: ‘Par ce 
pouvoir on n’entend autre chose que la volonté de l’homme qui est flexible & se 
peut porter où elle veut’ (191). But such a power is insufficient to do good 
without the aid of grace (191). 
Those who do not have ‘tout ce qui est necessaire de la part de Dieu 
pour accomplir les Commandemens’ are still culpable for not observing them. 
(191). Their lack of grace must be imputed to them. They themselves deprived 
themselves of this help, ‘qui ne leur est refusé qu’en punition de leurs pechez 
précedens, ou au moins du peché originel’ (191-2). 
But this seems to clash with the established maxim that no one is 
obliged to do what is impossible (‘ought’, as Kant remarked, ‘implies can’). 
We must, however, says Barcos, distinguish two kinds of impossibility or 
powerlessness (‘impuissance’). One is external in origin: we lack something 
outside ourselves, however strongly we want it. If confined in a house by 
violence, one can’t go to mass; if one has no money, one can’t give alms. The 
maxim applies in these cases, and God takes the will for the deed (192). The 
other kind is internal: it comes ‘du défaut de la volonté, de sa dureté & de son 
obstination’ (192-3). In sinners, this is a result of their sins. 
Toute la raison pour laquelle ils ne peuvent pas observer les 
commandemens de Dieu, c’est qu’ils ne le veulent pas; & ils ne le 
veulent pas parce que leur volonté est obstinée dans le mal, & qu’elle 
est toute dépravée; & cette dépravation & obstination sont volontaires 
en eux, ils les aiment, & ils se plaisent d’y demeurer. (193) 
 This kind of powerlessness can serve as no excuse when it prevents them 
from fulfilling commandments. 
 But why then does God give commandments to those to whom he will 
not grant the grace to fulfil them? First, says Barcos, rather surprisingly 
perhaps, to show us that it is not grace alone that acts in our salvation, but 
‘qu’il y a en nous une liberté, sans le vouloir & l’action de laquelle il n’est pas 
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 ‘Certum est nos mandata servare, si voluerimus’ (Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, 
XVI.32 (PL 44, 900)). 
 10 
possible d’accomplir ce qui est commandé’; secondly, to render man 
inexcusable in his own eyes, and strip him of the pretext of ignorance (193). 
Comme Dieu ne fait rien que pour ses Elûs, le grand dessein qu’il a en 
donnant ses Commandements à des pecheurs endurcis & qu’il a 
abandonnez, c’est de faire que ceux qui sont à lui par son élection 
éternelle, en profitent’ (194). 
They will learn that external graces are nothing unless an ‘onction intérieure’ 
changes and renews the heart (194).  
 There are in fact two ways in wich the just sometimes lack the necessary 
grace to fulfil the commandments. First, they do not have all the grace 
necessary to accomplish all the commandments so perfectly as not to transgress 
them in any way, even venially—otherwise it would be possible to live without 
sin, contra I John 1.8-10. Secondly, some (not all) of the just sometimes lack the 
grace necessary to avoid falling into mortal sin. Otherwise, anyone once 
justified would be certain to persevere, and this clashes with St Paul’s warning 
‘Que celui qui est debout, doit craindre de tomber’ (‘let him that thinketh he 
standeth take heed lest he fall’) (I Cor. 10.12). But while the just man remains 
just, he always has the necessary grace to fulfil the commandments, because he 
is actually fulfilling them. That is to say, righteousness consists in actually 
fulfilling the commandments: it is not, as in the Lutheran and Calvinist 
conception, merely imputed to an agent who fails in fact to fulfil them (195). 
 How about a possible compromise? Suppose the just do not always have 
sufficient grace to act: might it not be that they have sufficient grace to pray for 
the help they lack (this point of view is debated in Provinciales, I?)? No, says 
Barcos, because prayer demands grace no less than action. The faithful need 
efficacious grace both to pray and to act. ‘En l’un & en l’autre il faut que ce soit 
l’Esprit de Dieu qui forme dans eux le mouvement même de la volonté, par 
lequel ils agissent & par lequel ils prient’ (196). The alternative to this view is 
Semi-Pelagianism, because if you allow everyone the grace of prayer, you make 
them masters of their own salvation. Unbelievers, incidentally, do not have the 
grace of prayer, because they are incapable of any grace whatever (196). 
 The Second and Fourth Propositions deal with the resistibility of grace. 
Barcos notes that the Council of Trent had anathematized the view that grace 
cannot be resisted.21 Its target, as he says, was Luther and his followers, who 
allegedly make grace necessitating, ‘en sorte que le libre arbitre est purement 
passif, & ne fait que recevoir son action par une impression étrangere et 
violente comme un instrument inanimé’.22 Trent declares on the contrary:  
que le libre arbitre fait le bien, parce qu’il le veut faire; & que lors même 
qu’il le veut faire, il a le pouvoir de ne le pas vouloir; car quoique la 
grace qui nous est donnée, nous ôte la volonté de résister, elle ne nous 
ôte pas néanmoins le pouvoir. (171)  
                                                 
21
 See DS 1554, 1525.  
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 Calvin explicitly denies this interpretation of his position (Institution de la religion chrétienne 
(1541), ed. Olivier Millet, 2 vols (Geneva: Droz, 2008), ch. II, vol. I, p. 334). 
 11 
 But the Second Proposition does not say that interior grace cannot be 
resisted; it says that it is never resisted. Does Barcos hold this view? 
 First, he points out that we indubitably sometimes resist external graces 
(171). As for the internal variety, the answer is: ‘It depends.’ If they are ‘graces de 
l’esprit’ (good thoughts, illuminations), they can be resisted because (like 
external graces) they do not act on the will. If ‘graces de volonté’, it depends on 
whether these are weak or strong. 
Pour celles qui sont faibles, on y résiste, de telle sorte néantmoins, 
qu’on n’arréte pas leur effet prochain & immédiat, quoiqu’on empêche 
celui qu’elles devroient avoir, si elles trouvoient un sujet en qui il y eût 
moins d’obstacles. (172) 
This shows that it is erroneous to say ‘qu’on ne lui resiste jamais dans l’état de 
la nature corrompuë’. Barcos, then, explicitly denies the Second Proposition. 
 ‘Mais si ces graces sont fortes’, he adds, ‘elles ont toûjours leur entier & 
dernier effet’. And this is true even with hardened hearts, because such graces 
take away their hardness (172). They cannot be resisted in the sense of 
prevented from taking effect. But there can be resistance in the sense of 
opposition on the part of the will, owing to cupidity. Hence the struggles of 
which S. Paul speaks. This resistance is clearest as regards the initial grace, 
which finds our heart in a fundamentally contrary disposition of aversion from 
God, attachment to creatures. One can also resist grace by a change of 
disposition and will, ruining its effect by sin (173). The will is always mutable, 
and thus may wish not to persevere. Otherwise none of the faithful would lose 
the faith or be overcome by concupiscence, as St Prosper points out (174). The 
infallibility of the effect of efficacious grace thus does not imply the 
impossibility of resistance. So much for the Second Proposition. If the Fourth is 
taken (as the ‘Remarques’ take it) as essentially claiming that it is heretical to 
speak of grace as depending on human consent, then one could indeed see the 
same considerations as justifying the claim that Barcos does not endorse it. 
 The Third Proposition deals with the nature of the human freedom 
required for moral responsibility. Barcos maintains ‘que la Grace qui fait vouloir 
& faire le bien, ne blesse en rien la liberté’ (212: italics in original). In fact, so far 
from diminishing, grace perfects freedom, since man’s will is never freer than 
when grace gives him the help necessary to do good & avoid evil (212).23 
 But if grace determines the will, how can it not violate liberty? 
According to Goldmann, one of the marks of Barcos’s radicalism is his rejection 
of Thomism and Cartesianism, whereas Arnauld and Nicole make concessions 
to the former and espouse the latter.24 But in fact Barcos quotes the Thomist 
answer to this question with apparent approval. The Thomists claim: 
que la Grace faisant cette détermination, & agissant sur la volonté pour 
avoir son consentement, lui laisse le pouvoir de refuser; de sorte que la 
volonté produit tellement son action, qu’elle la peut suspendre & ne la 
produire pas; encore qu’il n’arrive jamais que la Grace opérant sur la 
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 Whether this response is entirely pertinent is discussed below. 
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 Barcos, Correspondance, 9-11; cf. p. 6. 
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volonté, cette même volonté résiste & ne suive pas son impression. 
(213) 
The power of the will to refuse its consent comes partly from its intrinsic 
flexibility to evil, but mainly:  
de ce poids, de cette inclination & de cette pente que nous avons au 
peché par la concupiscence, qui fait qu’il y a en nous une puissance de 
pecher tres-cachée, qui demeure toûjours dans l’homme, non 
seulement quand il est privé de la suavité de la Grace, mais même 
lorsqu’elle le ravit à lui-même par ses charmantes douceurs. (213-14). 
Augustine reconciles freedom and grace another way in his dispute with 
the Pelagians: instead of ruining freedom, as they claim, he contends that grace 
establishes, fortifies, and perfects it.   
Car si être libre, c’est avoir ses actions en sa puissance, c’est les faire 
quand on veut, il s’ensuit que la Grace qui nous donne la volonté, en 
nous faisant vouloir le bien, & nous le faisant vouloir fortement, nous 
donne aussi la véritable liberté, ce qu’elle fait en nous délivrant de la 
servitude de la concupiscence dominante, qui nous retient & nous 
empêche de nous porter au bien. (214-15) 
 The reason it is so widely believed that efficacious grace clashes with 
freedom is ‘une fausse notion de la liberté’ which conceives it as: 
une certaine indifférence par laquelle on veut que de quelque côté que 
se porte la volonté, ou du côté du bien, y étant attirée par la suavité de 
la Grace; ou du côté du mal, y étant entraînée par la mortelle douceur 
de la concupiscence, elle se trouve dans un équilibre qui fait qu’elle se 
peut tourner indifféremment vers le bien ou vers le mal: en sorte que 
lors même qu’elle est poussée par la Grace, ou emportée par la 
concupiscence, elle est toûjours en état de faire actuellement l’un ou 
l’autre, à raison de la flexibilité qui lui est naturelle. (215) 
 The Pelagians insisted that such indifference is necessary to liberty 
(Barcos no doubt intends the reader to make the connection with the Molinists, 
who held the same): but Augustine denies that this is so. 
Elle [cette indifférence] a toûjours été rejettée par saint Augustin, 
comme contraire au véritable sentiment qu’on doit avoir de la grace de 
Jesus-Christ, laquelle déterminant la volonté au bien, l’empêche de 
refuser son consentement, ou de vouloir se porter au mal, quoiqu’elle 
ne lui ôte pas la puissance de l’un & de l’autre. (215-16) 
Although Barcos seems to be saying that Augustine rejects the very 
notion of indifference, this is not quite what he means. He means that 
Augustine denies (a) that indifference is essential to freedom; and (b) in 
particular, that the will under the influence of grace or concupiscence is 
indifferent, in the sense of equally disposed to respond or not to respond to it 
(215-16). But Barcos does not reject the notion of indifference altogether. A 
certain kind of indifference is an inseparable companion of freedom in our 
present fallen state. But it is not a positive power of self-determination to either 
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one of two contraries, to use an expression of Descartes’,25 or, in Barcos’s words, 
‘une certaine disposition de l’ame qui fasse qu’elle se tourne où elle veut, 
comme aiant toûjours tout ce qui lui est nécessaire pour se déterminer elle-
même à ce qu’il lui plaira’. It consists in the fact that the will, even when under 
the influence of grace, always has the power to resist and not to do the good to 
which grace is applying it, or even to do the contrary evil, even though it will 
never actually do so, while under the influence (216).26 Such indifference is 
inseparable from freedom (and merit or demerit) in the state of corrupted 
nature: but it is far from essential to freedom as such (217). For as the will is 
fortified and established in the good, so this kind of indifference is diminished, 
‘l’homme n’étant jamais plus libre que quand il se porte au bien avec moins de 
résistance’ (217-18). Which shows that indifference of this kind not essential to 
freedom; else it would grow as freedom grows (218). It will not exist in heaven, 
when the will will be freest (221). 
But how can grace not jeopardise freedom when it seemingly 
necessitates the will, pushing and determining it to what it (grace) wills? To 
this question Barcos replies: 
Il n’est pas vrai qu’elle nécessite la volonté, elle ne lui fait aucune 
violence, elle ne la contraint nullement d’agir contre son gré; parce 
qu’en même temps qu’elle la fait agir, elle lui donne non seulement le 
pouvoir d’agir, mais aussi de le vouloir, & de le vouloir d’autant plus 
fortement que la Grace est plus forte & plus puissante: de sorte que 
bien loin que la volonté soit plus libre quand elle résiste à la Grace, 
pour être encore retenuë par la délectation charnelle de la 
concupiscence qui est souvent plus ardente & plus enflammée que la 
charité; au contraire elle ne l’est jamais davantage, que quand elle est 
plus assujetie & plus dans la dépendance de cette même Grace. (218-19) 
 Does not the will so influenced, however, act by necessity? Barcos’s 
answer involves careful distinctions. If by ‘necessairement’ you mean ‘que la 
volonté agisse par une necessité involontaire qui la force, la contraint &  lui fait 
faire ce qu’elle ne veut pas’, no. The will cannot be forced to want what it 
wants: ‘elle le veut toujours volontairement’ (219).27 If you mean ‘une necessité 
absoluë qui mette la volonté dans une fermeté immuable’, again no, because in 
the state of corrupted nature there are always the dregs of concupiscence, 
hence the power to resist (even if never the fact) (219-20). If you mean ‘une 
necessité qui laissant le pouvoir à la volonté de refuser son consentement, fait 
néanmoins qu’elle suive l’impression de la grace’, then, yes (220). 
The second kind of necessity mentioned above (being immutably 
established in the good and unable to turn to evil) is contrary to freedom in our 
present corrupted state: but not essentially, though. The blessed are free, 
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 Barcos refers here to Augustine, De civitate Dei, V.10. 
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though they love God necessarily and immutably, because their adherence to 
God 
ne vient pas d’une impression étrangere, ni d’un instinct & d’un 
mouvement indélibéré, mais du choix tres-libre de leur volonté, qui 
veut suivre leur droite raison, laquelle leur fait juger, mais avec un 
jugement pur, tranquille & parfait, que Dieu est infiniment aimable. 
(221)  
This necessity perfects, rather than destroying, their freedom (221). It 
eliminates indifference, but not liberty, for the reason we have seen. To be free, 
in short, it is sufficient that one is not acting from constraint or from an 
involuntary necessity (223). In saying this, however, Barcos comes close to 
restating the Third Proposition, which equates liberty with absence of coercion. 
I shall return to this point. 
 The definition of freedom as absence of coercion is purely negative. But 
for Barcos freedom has a positive content also. 
Elle consiste à avoir ses actions en sa puissance. La liberté n’est autre 
chose que sui potestas; être libre c’est être maitre de ses actions, c’est 
les faire quand on veut, car elles ne sont en notre puissance, qu’entant 
qu’elles se font aussi-tôt que nous le voulons; or il n’y a rien qui soit 
plus en nôtre puissance que nôtre volonté même, & par consequent il 
n’y a rien de plus libre que la volonté. (223-4)28 
But we act most voluntarily, and hence most freely, when under the 
influence of grace:  
L’homme n’agissant jamais avec plus de joie & avec plus de plaisir, & 
par consequent avec plus de volonté que lors que la Grace forme en lui 
la bonne volonté, que lorsqu’elle fond la dureté de son cœur par la 
douceur de son amour, que lorsque par sa force toute-puissante elle 
opére en lui le consentement, que lorsqu’elle l’incline, qu’elle le pousse, 
qu’elle de détermine, qu’elle le ravit, qu’elle l’emporte, & qu’elle 
l’aplique à vouloir le bien; jamais aussi il n’a une plus véritable & plus 
entiére liberté. (225).  
 In the light of this, are the ‘Remarques’ justified in claiming that Barcos 
has not fallen foul of the condemnation of the Third Proposition? He might 
seem to agree with it in so far as he equates freedom with absence of coercion. 
But, in Barcos, this is a statement about freedom in general, applicable to the 
blessed in heaven, as well as to human beings in this life. In this life, however, 
our freedom is always accompanied by indifference, albeit of a limited kind. It 
is therefore more than absence of coercion. It could therefore be argued that he 
does not share the conception of freedom of the implied author of the Third 
Proposition; at least, that is a defence that could be mobilized on his behalf.  
It is not, perhaps, however, fully adequate as it stands. Here a distinction 
comes into play. The Proposition mentions merit or demerit, but how we 
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interpret it depends on which we emphasize. Barcos and the author of the 
‘Remarques’ seem to be focusing on merit and therefore to be reading the 
Proposition as follows: man cannot merit without grace; but grace (efficacious 
grace, that is) imposes necessity, since we have no power to choose whether to 
accept it or not; however, this does not take away free will, because free will is 
suppressed only by coercion. Barcos, however, emphasizes that grace does not 
impose necessity, in the most obvious sense, and in fact enhances freedom. 
Consequently, from this point of view, he is not endorsing the condemned 
Proposition. But the Proposition also mentions demerit: and I think one can 
suggest this is actually the more important term, and that the prime issue 
involved here is not the effect of grace on the will (which subject is treated in 
the Second and Fourth Propositions). The condemnation of the Proposition 
may be directed rather at Jansenius’s claim that fallen man without grace lies 
under a general necessity of sinning, yet retains free will (and the capacity to 
merit or demerit) insofar as he does not act under compulsion.29 To dissent 
substantively from that one would need to explain, not only how the person 
moved by efficacious grace retains a certain indifference (residual 
concupiscence), but what kind of indifference might be possessed by the 
performer of a sinful act. Barcos does not investigate this point, although one 
can imagine an argument that runs like this: you committed fornication 
because you willingly succumbed to concupiscence (no one was forcing you), 
yet you could in a sense have refrained from it, if you had wanted to, because 
you knew it was wrong. Or, you refrained from fornication, and thus materially 
accomplished an act of chastity, though you did so only because your pride 
persuaded you to do so, so you were indifferent in the sense that there was a 
pull from both directions, rather than a single overmastering urge.30 
 Barcos’s engagement with the issue raised by the Fifth Proposition 
(whether Christ died for the sake of all human beings) is, as with the First, 
motivated by his desire to reject the thesis of a universal sufficient grace. If 
Jesus died to redeem all human beings (as 1 Timothy 2.6 implies), does it not 
follow that his sacrifice would be vain if God does not give all human beings a 
chance of redemption? Barcos denies the inference: that Jesus’s death was 
sufficient to redeem all human beings, does not mean that in fact it benefits 
them all (204). ‘Il est certain que Nôtre Seigneur n’a point eu une volonté 
formelle de mourir pour tous les hommes; c’est-à-dire, de faire part à tous du 
mérite de sa mort’ (205). Otherwise how to explain that he lets so many 
children perish without baptism, despite their parents’ and priests’ efforts; that 
he lets unbelievers perish in darkness, since he prevents the Gospel being 
preached to them (205-6)? I pass over Barcos’s exegesis of the key passages in St 
Paul to his summary of the essential points at issue. We should not say ‘que 
Nôtre Seigneur soit mort pour mériter des Graces suffisantes qui soient 
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données & à tous les hommes, & qui leur soient soumises pour en faire tel usage 
qu’il leur plaist; en sorte qu’il ne dépend que d’eux de croire, & de pratiquer 
toutes les œuvres necessaires pour parvenir au salut’ (212). But we may say that 
Jesus died for all human beings in these senses: 
 1. He died for a cause common to all, the sin with which they are all 
infected); 
 2. His death was sufficient ransom for all; 
 3. He died for all kinds of people; 
 4. He died for all the faithful, in so far as they all receive some fruit of his 
death. Several of the reprobate receive graces merited by his death (211-12). So it 
is not true that he died only for the salvation of the predestined, a view justly 
condemned (211). On this showing, Barcos is rejecting the labelling of the view 
that Christ died for all human beings as semi-Pelagian: consequently, he 
dissents from the Fifth Proposition.  
 What follows from all this? It seems, first of all, that Gerberon (if he is 
the author of the ‘Remarques’) has presented a fair account of Barcos’s views. If, 
then, ‘Jansenism’, then, is regarded (as its enemies regarded it) as a heresy 
consisting in doctrines summarised in the Five Propositions, then Gerberon 
seems justified in claiming that the Exposition does not fall foul of the 
condemnation of ‘Jansenism’. Barcos does not, to be sure, explicitly discuss the 
question of the Propositions’ presence in or absence from the text of the 
Augustinus; and the name of the Bishop of Ypres never appears once in the 
Exposition. But his discussion of several of the questions involved suggests that 
he was being careful to protect his text from accusations of ‘Jansenism’ based 
on the condemnation of the Propositions. Sainte-Beuve’s remarks about 
Barcos’s clumsiness of expression on points of doctrine seem, in this light, 
rather unfair. Whether the defence is altogether convincing is another 
question: it may well be the case that there is a substantial difference between 
the Jansenist position on the impossibility of the commandments and that of 
the Lutherans and Calvinists, but it seems hard to deny that the condemned 
First Proposition refers to the former, rather than the latter.  
 A few remarks in conclusion as to the relation between Pascal’s Écrits 
sur la grâce and the Exposition. Barcos’s patient catechetic exposition has none 
of the intellectual brilliance of Pascal’s work. Pascal seeks to be faithful to the 
teaching of Augustine while radically rethinking its basic categories. This 
appears from passages like the brilliant analysis of levels of agency in the 
seventh Écrit (257-9) or of dual relationships in the first:  
Il ne faut que remarquer qu’il y a deux manières dont l’homme 
recherche Dieu; deux manières dont Dieu recherche l’homme; deux 
manières dont Dieu quitte l’homme; deux dont l’homme quitte Dieu; 
deux dont l’homme persévère; deux dont Dieu persévère à lui faire du 
bien. (EG I, 218) 
But it would be entirely wrong to present this contrast as if Barcos were 
merely a foil for Pascal’s genius. Had he been capable of such an intellectual 
effort as Pascal’s, he would no doubt have eschewed it as self-assertion, 
succumbing to the libido sciendi (this is not to say he would have regarded 
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Pascal’s own efforts in this light). God has declared the truth in the Bible, and 
in the interpretations of the Fathers, ratified by the Church as definitive 
statements of its teaching: who are we to try to improve upon their 
formulations? 
As regards the major theological issues, there are no surprises here: the 
doctrines expounded by Barcos are essentially those upheld by Pascal. To take a 
couple of examples: Pascal too argues, as regards the possibility of the 
commandments, that what Trent condemns is the view that they are 
intrinsically impossible to the just, whereas the view that he upholds is that 
they are sometimes so.31  Like Barcos again, Pascal contends that in a sense we 
always have the possibility of observing the commandments, since if we wanted 
to fulfil them, we could do so. What we do not have is an effective power, since 
we cannot want to fulfil them without grace (EG, V, 247-8; XII, 295-6). Pascal’s 
analysis of the proposition that Christ died for all human beings is also pretty 
close to that of Barcos (EG VII, 261-2). But, unlike Barcos, he does not 
distinguish senses in which the proposition can be upheld and those in which it 
cannot. To be precise, Pascal says that ‘Dieu a envoyé Jésus-Christ pour sauver 
[…] ceux qu’ils a choisis et prédestinés […], qu’il n’y a que ceux-là à qui il ait 
voulu absolument mériter le salut par sa mort’ (261-2). Though the ‘absolument’ 
registers the kind of nuances we find in Barcos’s analysis, and there appears to 
be no substantial difference between their positions, Pascal’s formulation does 
not show the same concern to negotiate a way round the condemnation of the 
Fifth Proposition. In a sense, therefore, it highlights by contrast what I take to 
be the tactical aspect of Barcos’s text.  
 The conception of grace as delectation is likewise common to both 
authors, as is the analysis of the compatibility with freedom of grace so 
conceived.  
L’homme n’agissant jamais avec plus de joie & avec plus de plaisir, & 
par consequent avec plus de volonté que lors que la Grace forme en lui 
la bonne volonté, que lorsqu’elle fond la dureté de son cœur par la 
douceur de son amour, que lorsque par sa force toute-puissante elle 
opére en lui le consentement, que lorsqu’elle l’incline, qu’elle le pousse, 
qu’elle de détermine, qu’elle le ravit, qu’elle l’emporte, & qu’elle 
l’aplique à vouloir le bien; jamais aussi il n’a une plus véritable & plus 
entiére liberté. (Barcos, 225) 
Compare the reference in the Écrits sur la grâce to: 
la grâce médicinale, la grâce de Jésus-Christ, qui n’est autre chose 
qu’une suavité et une délectation dans la loi de Dieu, répandue dans le 
cœur par le Saint-Esprit, qui non seulement égalant, mais surpassant 
encore la concupiscence de la chair, remplit la volonté d’une plus 
grande délectation dans le bien, que la concupiscence ne lui en offre 
dans le mal, et qu’ainsi le libre arbitre, charmés par les douceurs et par 
les plaisirs que le Saint-Esprit lui inspire, plus que par les attraits du 
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péché choisit infailliblement lui-même la Loi de Dieu par cette seule 
raison qu’il y trouve plus de satisfaction et qu’il y sent sa béatitude et sa 
félicité. 
De sorte que ceux à qui il plaît à Dieu à donner cette grâce, se portent 
d’eux-mêmes par leur libre arbitre à préférer infailliblement Dieu à la 
créature.  Et c’est pourquoi on dit indifféremment ou que le libre 
arbitre s’y porte de soi-même par le moyen de cette grâce, parce qu’en 
effet il s’y porte, ou que cette grâce y porte le libre arbitre, parce que 
toutes les fois qu’elle est donnée, le libre arbitre s’y porte 
infailliblement. (EG, XI, 290) 
 But in the Provinciales, Pascal gives what may appear as a richer analysis 
of delectation:  
Selon ce grand saint [Augustine] […] Dieu change le cœur de l’homme 
par une douceur céleste qu’il y répand, qui surmontant la délectation 
de la chair, fait que l’homme sentant d’un côté sa mortalité et son 
néant, et découvrant de l’autre la grandeur et l’éternité de Dieu,  
conçoit du dégoût pour les délices du péché qui le séparent du bien 
incorruptible, et trouvant sa plus grande joie dans le Dieu qui le 
charme, il s’y porte infailliblement de lui-même, par un mouvement 
tout libre, tout volontaire, tout amoureux. (Les Provinciales, XVIII, OC, 
I. 800-1) 
Barcos carefully distinguishes between graces of the mind, which do not 
act on the will, and graces of the will, which, as their name suggests, do (172). 
By, on the other hand, incorporating a cognitive element into his presentation 
of efficacious grace, so that not only do we respond to the delectation it 
communicates, but we are aware of ourselves as so responding, as consenting to 
this grace rather than merely succumbing to it, Pascal makes more intelligible 
the reconciliation of grace and liberty, and the claim that we ourselves can in 
some sense own the acts we perform under the influence of grace.  
One observation in conclusion that applies to both writers, and perhaps 
to the whole body of doctrine they are defending. Pascal makes the brilliant 
observation about Molinism that, unlike Calvinism, it has the attraction of 
appealing to common sense (EG, VII, 260). Or rather, to quote his exact term, 
‘flattering’ it. We must instead prefer the unflattering truths of Augustine’s 
doctrine. In philosophy as in theology, we are often challenged by the most 
powerful thinkers to abandon our attachment to common sense. But in such 
cases the question arises to what extent we should suspend feelings of 
incredulity or even revulsion. Revulsion is certainly part of both writers’ 
reactions to Calvinism: Barcos speaks of ‘les impietez & les blasphémes qu’a 
vomi (sic) en ces derniers siécles Calvin le dernier des hérétiques’ (267); Pascal 
calls Calvinism an ‘opinion épouvantable’, ‘injurieuse à Dieu et insupportable 
aux hommes’ (EG VII, 260). Both of them insist that Augustine’s doctrine of 
predestination and reprobation is quite different from Calvin’s: whereas the 
latter teaches that God’s will, prior to any foreseen sin, is the sole cause of 
reprobation, and that some human beings were created in order to be damned 
(267-8), the former, says Barcos, regards Original Sin as the cause of 
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reprobation (268-9). There is a substantial difference here, between 
supralapsarian and infralapsarian conceptions of predestination. Moreover, for 
the Jansenists, although election is an altogether gratuitous act of mercy, 
unrelated to any foreseen merit, reprobation is in virtue of foreseen demerit 
(including that of Original Sin): thus Barcos says: ‘Dieu ne prédestine les 
mechans à la mort éternelle qu’après la prévision de leurs pechez, & 
principalement du peché originel’ (233). The Calvinists, on the other hand, 
impioiusly and blasphemously make God responsible for reprobation also: 
before any prevision of their sins, certain human beings have been created to be 
damned (267-8). 
Pascal makes the point at more length:  
Ils [les disciples de saint Augustin] entendent que Dieu a séparé cette 
masse toute également coupable et tout entière digne de damnation, 
qu’il en a voulu sauver une partie par une volonté absolue fondée sur sa 
miséricorde toute pure et gratuite, et que laissant l’autre dans la 
damnation où elle était et où il pouvait avec justice laisser la masse 
entière, il a prévu ou les péchés particuliers que chacun commettrait, 
ou au moins le péché originel dont ils sont tous coupables, et 
qu’ensuite de cette prévision il les a voulu condamner. (EG, VII, 261) 
Or, as he says more succinctly,  ‘l’Église prétend que la prédestination 
vient de la volonté absolue de Dieu et la réprobation de la prévision du péché’ 
(EG, XV, 310). The Calvinists, on the other hand, ascribe both predestination 
and reprobation to the absolute will of God. In other words, whereas ‘l’Église 
pose que la volonté de Dieu est la source du salut et que la volonté des hommes 
est la source de la damnation’, the Calvinists make God’s will the source of both 
salvation and damnation (EG, XV, 310).  
Calvinism, then, the implication is, does not deal in unpalatable truth, 
but in revolting falsehoods. Unlike the doctrine of Augustine. Take his view of 
perseverance, as expounded by both Barcos and Pascal. We might suppose that 
if a person has been justified, and has lived a morally good Christian life, and 
afterwards falls away, that this is in a key sense their own fault: they have 
squandered the graces they were offered. After all, Barcos points out that the 
will is always mutable, and thus may wish not to persevere (Exposition, 174). 
But for Augustine this is only superficially true, as Barcos explains elsewhere: 
one may be granted grace, yet not perseverance in grace (208). It is not enough 
to say that God predestined grace, with which human beings can do good 
works, and persevere in the good if they wish (238-9).32 God gives the gift of 
perseverance to some, not to others, because he wants the elect, and not the 
reprobate, to obtain glory (248). He may allow the elect to fall so as to 
humiliate them, but even their sins are turned to good. Whereas the reprobate 
may do good works, but they incur a greater punishment when they abandon 
virtue and good works and plunge into vice through the wickedness of their 
will—which they infallibly will, since they don’t receive the gift of perseverance, 
and so they are damned (254). If one asks how it is that God will genuinely 
                                                 
32
 Barcos thus rejects the scholastic distinction between predestination to grace and 
predestination to glory (pp. 239-40). For Augustine, there is only one predestination. 
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remit sin and eternal punishment by Baptism, and yet refuse the gift of 
perseverance, without which one is bound to fall back into sin and its penalty 
(271-2), the answer is to hand: 
Le peché originel par qui tous les hommes devant Dieu ne sont qu’une 
masse de perdition, lui donne un droit souverain de vie & de mort sur 
eux; de les laisser tous périr, s’il le veut; de leur donner tant & si peu de 
graces qu’il lui plaît. (272) 
 Essentially the same teaching is propounded by Pascal, but in different 
terms, in his stark doctrine of the ‘double délaissement’.33 If some of the 
justified abandon God, there is a terrible sense in which he abandons them 
first. For he does not give them the gift of perseverance. True, Christ said: 'Ask, 
and it will be given to you; search, and you will find; knock, and the door will 
be opened to you' (Matthew 7. 7). So those who pray for grace will never be 
denied. But prayer itself requires a gift of grace: it is not altogether within our 
power. And God sometimes withholds the grace of prayer from individuals 
hitherto in a state of grace and obedience to His will. Unable to pray, they will 
inevitably turn away from God. But it was God's denial of the grace of prayer 
that caused their abandonment of him. Why they are cast away, we cannot 
know: but it cannot be as a result of some action on their part, for if a person in 
a state of grace could choose, of his or her own initiative, to abandon God, then 
the efficacy of grace would depend on the human will, and we would be back in 
semi-Pelagianism.34 Pascal argues that salvation and damnation result in a 
sense from God’s will and in a sense from man’s; but that God’s will is the 
dominant one, since it is the cause of man’s will, rather than being caused by it. 
Where one will is dominant, the other subordinate, the action is to be ascribed 
to the former rather than the latter (VII, 259). On this showing, to say that X, 
who was for a time among the justified, but who has fallen from grace, has done 
so by his own fault, and is damned for the sins he will commit as a result, is to 
make man’s will only the subordinate cause of reprobation. The dominant 
cause is God’s decision to deny him perseverance. The mechanism of 
reprobation is no doubt different in this account and in that of the Calvinists. 
But in both cases it seems hard to deny that God is responsible. In this light the 
substantive difference between Jansenist theology and that of Calvinism is less 
clear-cut than the Jansenists argue.35  
                                                 
33
 On this 'double abandonment' (by God of man, and man by God) see EG VI, 251-6; VII, 262; 
VIII, 264-71; IX, 278-83; XII, 296-8. According to Philippe Sellier, Pascal probably found the 
doctrine in the work of Amable de Bourzeis: Sellier stresses the importance of the notion for 
Pascal, existential as well as theological) (Pascal et saint Augustin, pp. 353-4; cf. pp. 257-8, 274). 
There is a discussion of the Écrits sur la grâce in Moriarty, ‘Grace and Religious Belief in Pascal’, 
in Nicholas Hammond (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Pascal (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 144-61. 
34
 It is, though, in a sense their own fault: because if they had wanted to persevere, they would 
have been able to do so (EG VII, 262): even if in the last analysis it was God that wanted them 
not to want to persevere.  
35
 Leszek Kolakowski is one scholar who tends to minimize the difference between Jansenism 
and Calvinism (God Owes Us Nothing: A Brief Remark on Pascal’s Religion and on the Spirit of 
Jansenism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995). His views are discussed in 
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